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The paper aims to describe the evolution part of the economy and power to tax 
in Colombia. It also explains the failure of the government and the problems 
that have expanded public sector expenditures. Furthermore, we identify 
the aspects of political economy have influenced the evolution of the 
state. Describes why fiscal conditions in Colombia have affected distributive 
justice and social rights. 
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In general it can be argued that the changes are reflected in State revenues, 
expenditures and employment. The information we have on income (tax and 
non-tax) is simpler and more orderly than that of spending and 
employment. This difference is partly because the collection of taxes is 
centralized (national, municipal and departmental), while expenditures are 
multiple derivations. 
In fiscal theory insists that the way it funds the State is crucial to 
understand its nature. Statistics on public sector facilitate the monitoring of the 
modalities of intervention, but it is difficult to draw conclusions about how it 
has been piecing public spending over time. This deficiency makes the 
understanding of the specific way the state has evolved. 
State interactions have been analyzed from different angles1. But in the 
case of Colombia has given attention to its role in the context of comparative 
politics (Tovar 1984, Kalmanovitz 2001)2. There is no unified language for 
understanding how state policy affects employment, controlling inflation, 
economic growth and macroeconomic stability (Londoño 1995). The 
approaches are partial (Ocampo 1992). 
The conception of the State in Colombia has changed throughout 
history3. 
 
Between 1970 and 1974 developed the Four Strategies plan that aimed to 
encourage the leading sectors, construction and exports, with 
the complementary strategies of increasing agricultural productivity and 
improving income distribution. In the period 1975-1978 was submitted to 
Congress on Plan to Close the Gap, whose goal was to raise the living 
standards of the most vulnerable population, particularly rural, stabilizing 
the economy and eliminating untargeted subsidies that were granted 
to different production sectors4. 
In the early seventies began to be questioned for the first time the 
efficiency of government machinery had been established for nearly half a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  See,	  for	  example,	  Przeworski	  and	  Curvale	  (2007),	  Fitoussi	  (2004),	  and	  Devillanova	  Casarico	  (2007).	  
2	  The	  Colombian	  academic	  tradition	  in	  comparative	  political	  analysis	   is	  rather	  few.	  The	  abundant	  literature	  
on	  basic	  concepts	  of	  public	  administration	  or	  constitutionalism,	  lack	  the	  analytic	  property	  that	  can	  be	  noted	  
appropriately	  teaching	  relations	  between	  the	  theoretical	  and	  practical	  problems	  of	  Colombian	  society.	  Work	  
on	  "state	  theory"	  in	  a	  context	  of	  international	  debate,	  are	  beginning	  to	  appear	  (Uprimny	  2001,	  Garcia	  2006,	  
Moncayo,	  2006).	  	  	  
3	   The	   reform	   of	   1936	   gave	   powers	   to	   the	   State	   to	   intervene	   in	   the	   economy	   through	   rationalization	   of	  
production,	   distribution	   and	   consumption,	   and	   the	   protection	   of	   workers	   in	   accordance	  with	   established	  
rights.	  In	   the	   late	   fifties	  created	   the	  National	  Economic	  Policy	  and	  Planning,	   the	  Planning	  Department	  and	  
Technical	  Services,	  which	  are	  entities	  responsible	  for	  recommending	   lines	  of	  economic	  policy.	  In	  1968,	  the	  
administrative	  reform	  of	  Lleras,	  modified	  structures	  of	  the	  Council	  and	  the	  above-­‐mentioned	  entities	  were	  
transformed	  into	  the	  National	  Economic	  and	  Social	  Policy	  (CONPES),	  and	  the	  National	  Planning	  Department	  
(DNP),	   respectively.	  In	   the	   seventies	   consolidate	   development	   plans,	   but	   since	   the	   mid-­‐eighties,	   the	   real	  
sector	   planning	   is	   losing	   importance,	   and	   development	   plans	   become	   budget	   management	   programs,	  
without	   vision	   and	   long	   term.	  DNP	   loses	   the	   strategic	   horizon	   and	   becomes	   an	   entity	   that	   regulates	   the	  
investment	  program	  and	  short	  term.	  
4	  In	  1979	  he	  launched	  the	  National	  Integration	  Plan	  (PIN),	  which	  focused	  its	  interest	  in	  infrastructure	  sectors	  
(energy,	  mining,	   transport	   and	  media)	   and	   to	   grant	   greater	   autonomy	   to	   the	   regions.	  In	   the	  period	  1983-­‐
1986	   was	   presented	   the	   plan	   change	   with	   Equity,	   seeking	   short-­‐term	   goal	   of	   economic	   recovery,	   with	   a	  
renewed	   emphasis	   on	   public	   housing	   policy,	   and	   suggested	   a	   set	   of	   policies	   and	   long	   term,	   aim	   at	  
addressing	  ensure	  growth	  of	  industry	  and	  agriculture.	  
century to postulate the need to partially dismantle the interventionist 
state. This conception is customary compared of "neoliberal" reflected a new 
wave of international thinking, but was reflected in a limited way in 
Colombia. The term neoliberal is inadequate because it ignores the potential 
that is classical liberalism to build a society with high social content 
(Gonzalez 1997)5. 
During the Lopez Michelsen (1974-1978), was given a new impetus to 
social programs with the law of nationalization of education, the Food and 
Nutrition Program (PAN) and the Integrated Rural Development 
(IRD). Mining policy was modified by removing the colonial system of 
"concessions" and replaced by "partnership contracts" between state 
enterprises and foreign firms. During the administration Turbay Ayala (1978-
1982), state investment in infrastructure became the center of the development 
plan6. 
Finally, during the Betancourt administration (1982-1986), was 
launched the popular housing plan more ambitious in the history of the 
country and began to bear fruit mining policies adopted since 1974. During 
the Barco administration (1986-1990) the emphasis was on the social, 
particularly in what was called the elimination of absolute poverty. Ship began 
the process of gradually opening. For the Gaviria administration (1990-1994) 
State modernization was a priority. His Minister of Finance (Rudolf Hommes) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  In	  these	  years	  in	  the	  United	  States	  began	  the	  deregulation	  of	  the	  aviation	  sector,	  which	  led	  to	  start	  similar	  
programs	  in	  other	  sectors	  of	  the	  U.S.	  economy.	  Although	  new	  concepts	  appreciably	  affected	  entities	  
responsible	  for	  industrial	  and	  agricultural	  policies	  are	  not	  the	  same	  thing	  happened	  in	  other	  areas	  of	  state	  
action.	  The	  intervention	  in	  the	  energy	  sector	  and	  mining,	  infrastructure	  construction	  and	  the	  provision	  of	  
social	  services,	  among	  others,	  tended	  rather	  to	  worsen	  and	  the	  relative	  size	  of	  the	  public	  sector	  continued	  
to	  grow.	  
6	   The	   Samper	   administration	   (1994-­‐1998)	   called	   Salto	   Social	   development	   plan,	   which	   aimed	   to	   achieve	  
growth	   rates	   that	  allow	  attacking	  poverty	  of	  millions	  of	  Colombians.	  It	   is,	   then,	   to	   "build	  a	  new	  economic	  
and	  productive	  citizen."	  The	  government	   tried	   to	   correct	   the	   structural	   imbalances	   in	   the	  current	  account	  
that	   had	   caused	   the	   opening,	   and	   the	   revaluation	   of	   the	   peso,	   but	   the	   scope	   for	   economic	   authorities	  
decreased	   considerably	   with	   the	   so-­‐called	   "8,000	   process".With	   Andrés	   Pastrana	   (1998-­‐2002)	   arrived	  
Change	   for	  Building	  Peace.Colombian	  economic	   crisis	  of	  1999	   (the	  worst	   since	   the	  Great	  Depression)	  was	  
the	   result	   of	   structural	   problems	   that	   began	   in	   1991	   and	   which	   were	   not	   resolved	   during	   the	   Samper	  
administration.	  	  
accentuated the opening of the economy, put first the fight against inflation 
and sought to reduce the size of government7. 
Álvaro Uribe Velez (2002-2010) placed emphasis on achieving greater 
security, as a condition to achieve a prosperous and modern economy. It was 
the purpose of the call democratic security (Estrada 2006)8. 
It is increasingly clear that the discontinuity between state and market is 
false9. After Gaviria governments have yielded to the temptation to confuse 
the functions of State government, with the aim of promoting structural 
reforms have been inadequate for their weak ties to specific problems of the 
regions and departments. The evolution of Colombian institutions responded 
more circumstantial regarding each government, a global conception of the 
state. There has been no unified vision of reform, and institutions has not been 
consolidated. 
In Colombia, the conflict has been living with medium development 
levels, with relative macroeconomic stability, and a flawed but enduring 
democratic system (Gómez 1999). The precariousness of the state is reflected 
in their difficulties in reducing agricultural problems, paramilitarism and drug 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  See	  also	  Perry,	  Lora	  and	  Rodriguez	  (1992).	  
8	  "The	  Uribe	  government	  came	  with	  the	  conviction	  of	  the	  need	  to	  introduce	  major	  changes	  related	  to	  the	  
uncontrolled	  growth	  of	  public	  spending,	  the	  uncertainty	  expressed	  in	  violence,	  drug	  trafficking	  and	  the	  
intensification	  of	  social	  conflict	  ...	  The	  current	  government	  plan	  also	  includes	  achieving	  a	  sustainable	  
economic	  growth	  and	  job	  creation.	  The	  Community	  State	  should	  be	  equitably	  shared	  economic	  growth	  
between	  different	  social	  groups,	  regions,	  rural	  and	  city	  and	  the	  different	  genres.	  The	  promise	  of	  renewal	  
includes	  a	  deep	  state	  administrative	  restructuring	  through	  liquidation	  or	  merger	  of	  entities,	  streamlining	  the	  
size	  of	  government	  "(presidential	  and	  DNP	  2002).	  
9	  With	  the	  passage	  of	  time,	  the	  regulatory	  role	  of	  the	  state	  has	  attained	  greater	  significance.	  In	  Colombia	  this	  
work	   is	   done	   in	   very	   different	   ways.	  The	   legislative	   and	   administrative	   changes	   are	   very	  
important.	  Institutional	   expressions	   of	   this	   state	   function	   are,	   among	   others,	   the	   central	   bank,	   the	   utility	  
regulatory	   commissions,	   the	   National	   Television	   Commission,	   the	   National	   Civil	   Service	   Commission,	  
supervisory	   /.	  These	  new	   forms	  of	   state	  action	  have	  been	  consolidated,	  especially	   since	   the	  nineties.	  "The	  
state	   is	   the	   ultimate	   mechanism	   that	   modern	   societies	   have	   developed	   to	   find	   an	   appropriate	   balance	  
between	  market	  and	  society,	  between	  private	  interest	  and	  collective	  interest	  to	  help	  build	  capacity,	  security	  
and	  access	  to	  power	  for	  all	  members	  of	  society,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  to	  ensure	  an	  environment	   in	  which	  
markets	  work	  properly,	  on	   the	  other.	  But	   it	   is	  obviously	   the	  only	   instrument.	  There	  are	  other	   institutions,	  
from	  the	  family	  to	  the	  many	  civil	  society	  organizations,	  performing	  tasks	  in	  these	  areas.	  Understanding	  this	  
is	   the	   more	   important	   as	   we	   now	   understand	   much	   better	   than	   before,	   that	   just	   as	   there	   are	   "market	  
failures"	   (the	   risk	   of	   exclusion	   or	   failure	   of	   the	   market	   alone	   to	   generate	   the	   contexts	   in	   which	   it	   is	  
developed	  properly),	  there	  also	  bulging	  "government	  failures"	  bureaucratic	  rationality	  and	  patronage	  in	  the	  
functioning	   of	   state	   institutions,	   problems	   of	   representation,	   predominance	   in	   the	   operation	   of	   state	  
institutions	  of	  the	  dominant	  economic	  interests,	  opportunities	  created	  by	  government	  intervention	  for	  the	  
"renter"	  and	  information	  problems	  that	  affect	  government	  action”,	  Ocampo,	  2001,	  p.	  39).	  
trafficking. Decentralization of political power was giving way to the ability 
of some mafia groups that are "locally made state" (Estrada, 2009)10. 
Throughout the twentieth century, the Colombian State has adapted to 
the needs imposed by economic conditions. In addition to internal processes, 
the international dynamics have influenced the definition of the type of state11. 
On examination of the characteristics of Colombian should be noted, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Institutional	  stability	  in	  the	  regions	  over	  the	  coming	  years	  will	  depend	  on	  the	  state's	  ability	  to	  recover	  the	  
fragile	   balance	   of	   local	   authorities	   in	   the	   municipal	   and	   rural	   areas	   (Catatumbo,	   Putumayo,	   and	  
Buenaventura).	  It	  precipitated	  say	  that	  Colombia	  has	   lost	  the	  territory,	  although	  there	   is	  a	  clear	  conflict	   in	  
different	   regions	   of	   political	   geography.	  Between	   1988	   and	   2005	   has	   a	   high	   rate	   of	   killings	   and	  
massacres.	  State	  representatives	  at	  the	  local	  level	  (police,	  mayors,	  governors,	  prosecutors)	  abandoned	  their	  
commitments,	   or	   were	   bowed	   by	   threats	   and	   intimidation	   of	   violent	   actors.	  The	   scandal	   of	   the	   "para-­‐
politics"	  permeates	  social	  life	  more	  individual	  collaboration	  of	  some	  citizens	  in	  the	  conflict.	  The	  dynamics	  of	  
the	  massacres	  was	   reproduced	   in	   ascending	   order.	  And	  while	   the	   country	  maintained	   reasonable	   growth	  
rates,	  the	   logic	  of	  expansion	  of	  self-­‐defense	  groups	  created	  a	  territorial	  and	  strategic	  corridor	  that	  divided	  
geographically	  north	  of	  the	  center	  of	  the	  country.	  A	  formal	  command	  economy	  went	  into	  competition	  with	  
informal	   forms	   of	   derivatives	   of	   coca	   production	   from	   Urabá,	   Bajo	   Cauca,	   southern	   Bolivar	   and	  
Catatumbo.	  This	  points	  out	  that	  the	  State	  represented	  a	  fragmented	  unit	  in	  locations	  exposed	  to	  the	  risk	  of	  
permanently	  parallel	  state	  (Duncan	  2006).	  
11	   	  	  During	   the	  nineteenth	  century	   look	  different	  emphasis	   in	   relation	   to	   the	  state	  and	  the	  economy:	   from	  
the	   traditional	   role	  of	  Spanish	  Patrimonial	  State,	   through	  a	  policy	  of	  building	  up	   the	  defense	  of	  a	  classical	  
liberal	  conception	  /.	  In	   the	   first	   two	  decades	  of	   the	   twentieth	  century,	   the	  Colombian	  state	  complies	  with	  
the	  classical	   conception	  of	   the	   rule	  of	   law.	  In	   the	  decade	   following	   the	  government	  began	   to	  play	  a	  more	  
active	   role	   in	   economic	   management.	  In	   this	   transformation	   were	   critical	   experiences	   of	   the	   Mexican	  
Revolution,	   the	   American	   New	   Deal,	   the	   experience	   of	   the	   Spanish	   Republic	   and	   the	   Weimar	  
Republic.	  Completing	  the	  century,	  again	  giving	  the	  market	  a	  greater	  role	  in	  resource	  allocation,	  following	  a	  
line	  similar	   to	   the	  one	  presented	   in	   the	  United	  States,	  England	  and	  multilateral	   institutions	   like	  the	  World	  
Bank,	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  or	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  Development	  Bank.	  But	  this	  trend	  contrasts	  with	  
many	  provisions	  of	  the	  1991	  Constitution,	  in	  which	  there	  is	  a	  real	  wealth	  of	  articles	  relating	  to	  the	  regulation	  
of	   the	   economy.	  The	   constitutional	   text	   does	  not	   express	   a	   single	   type	  of	   state.	  Monetary	   policy	   and	   the	  
independence	  of	   the	  Bank	  of	   the	  Republic	   serve	  an	  unorthodox	   scheme,	  minimalist.	  But	   the	   functions	   for	  
the	   rule	   of	   law,	   are	   more	   unorthodox,	   and	   require	   direct	   interventions	   and	   lead	   to	   increases	   in	   public	  
spending.	  Economic	   policy	   must	   contribute	   to	   the	   satisfaction	   of	   economic,	   social	   and	   cultural	  
rights.	  Economic	   freedom	   and	   private	   initiative	   must	   be	   compatible	   with	   the	   common	   good,	   the	  
environment	  and	  cultural	  heritage	  of	   the	  nation.	  The	  general	  direction	  of	   the	  economy	   is	   in	  charge	  of	   the	  
State,	   which	   must	   intervene	   to	   improve	   the	   quality	   of	   life	   of	   people,	   equity	   in	   the	   distribution	   of	  
opportunities	   and	   the	   preservation	   of	   a	   healthy	   environment.	  There	   is	   a	   clear	   asymmetry	   between	   the	  
effects	  Constitutional	  of	  1991,	   framed	   in	  a	  kind	  of	   rule	  of	   law,	  with	   the	   fiscal	  necessity	  of	  a	  minimal	  state	  
(Wiesner	   2004).	  We	   observe	   a	   discontinuity	   between	   the	   changes	   proposed	   by	   the	   Constitution	   of	   91	   in	  
terms	   of	   a	   social	   state	   of	   law,	   and	   the	   precarious	   institutional	   evolution.	  There	   is	   a	   tension	   between	   the	  
conservative	   spirit	   that	   encourages	   organizations	   like	   the	   Bank	   of	   the	   Republic,	   and	   the	   broad	   social	  
possibilities	   that	   allows	   the	   application	   for	   protection.	   Intuitively	   you	   may	   notice,	   as	   the	   boundary	   of	  
balance,	  that	  the	  1991	  Constitution	  was	   inspired	  by	  some	  aspects	  of	  the	  Rawlsian	  conception	  of	   justice	  as	  
fairness	  (Rawls	  1971).	  A	  refund	  of	  social	  rights	  by	  passing	  mandatory	  rebuilds	  the	  redistributive	  mechanisms	  
of	  the	  economy.	  But	  Rawls	  demanded	  just	  the	  inspiration	  a	  reality	  for	  the	  Colombian	  case	  was	  distant,	  since	  
the	  criteria	  of	  equality	  and	  liberty	  only	  under	  conditions	  of	  materiality	  are	  different	  opportunities,	  capacities	  
and	  incentives	  (Sen	  1985).	  
moreover, the heterogeneity of the country. This is a regional political 
geography and relatively complex when compared with other Latin American 
countries. This has had a profound impact on national economic and political 
development. This configuration has influenced heterogeneous violence12.  
It is possible to relate these comments to statistics presented by the 
Dane on income, expenditure and public sector production (2008)13. 
State involvement in the economy has grown14. In Colombia we observe 
an increase in the state's share in GDP. Wagner (1883, 1892) into law 
proposes the following principle: government spending as a percentage of 
GDP always increases. This trend is evident in the series Colombian (Figure 
1). Public spending grew15. The result is relevant because the continuity of the 
series contrasts with the diversity of policies that have tried to 
implement. Proposals for government policy are different and yet, public 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	   In	  policy	  terms	  of	  state	  regional	  heterogeneity	  has	  fragmented	  the	  efforts	  of	  the	  economy	  to	  overcome	  
what	  Nieto	  (1971)	  called	  "a	  country	  with	  an	  economy	  of	  the	  archipelago".	  One	  of	  the	  most	  perverse	  effects	  
of	   regional	  heterogeneity	   is	   the	  absence	  of	  a	   consolidated	  market.	  This	   regional	  heterogeneous	  condition	  
had	  a	  decisive	  effect	  on	  the	  process	  of	  deindustrialization	  (Echavarria,	  Villamizar,	  2007)	  as	  the	  main	  regions	  
of	   the	   country	   were	   built	   only	   through	  modern	   communications	   in	   late.	   Colombia	   is	  moving	   very	   slowly	  
towards	  the	  consolidation	  of	  the	  domestic	  market.	  See	  Gallup,	  Gaviria	  and	  Lora	  (2003,)	  Montenegro	  (2006).	  
13	  Trends	  in	  the	  series	  can	  be	  derived	  the	  following	  general	  conclusions:	  i)	  The	  State's	  participation	  in	  the	  
GDP	  has	  grown.	  ii)	  The	  weight	  of	  monetary	  policy	  has	  increased.	  iii)	  The	  expenditure	  has	  been	  slowly	  piecing	  
together	  toward	  a	  police	  state	  and	  weakly	  favorable	  to	  welfare.	  iV)	  Public	  policy	  has	  chosen	  to	  redistribute	  
wealth	  by	  way	  of	  expenditure	  and	  income.	  v)	  The	  State	  makes	  efforts	  to	  focus	  resources,	  forcibly	  removing	  
the	  decentralization	  process.	  With	  the	  information	  available	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  examine	  state	  processes	  such	  
as:	  i)	  Increasing	  regulatory	  function	  of	  the	  state.	  ii)	  The	  political	  fragmentation,	  and	  progress	  to-­‐state	  
structure.	  iii)	  The	  internal	  modifications	  of	  monetary	  policy.	  These	  comments	  relate	  to	  the	  basic	  series	  of	  
national	  accounts.	  Undoubtedly,	  the	  existing	  information	  allows	  for	  numerous	  relationships	  that	  help	  to	  
understand	  the	  dynamics	  of	  the	  state.	  Based	  on	  household	  surveys	  is	  possible,	  for	  example,	  obtain	  a	  figure	  
for	  number	  of	  employees.	  However	  this	  is	  the	  result	  of	  a	  sample,	  and	  as	  such	  is	  not	  relevant	  to	  know	  the	  
absolute	  value	  of	  employment,	  although	  it	  can	  be	  very	  useful	  to	  know	  the	  relative	  weight	  of	  public	  
procurement	  in	  total	  employment.	  The	  statistics	  also	  allow	  make	  considerations	  about	  the	  impact	  of	  tax	  on	  
the	  structure	  of	  household	  consumption.	  But	  again,	  these	  results	  are	  indirect.	  
14	  "Government	  expenditures,	  which	  are	  a	  good	  reflection	  of	  the	  size	  of	  the	  state,	  are	  at	  the	  highest	  level	  of	  
the	  century	  (21%	  of	  GDP).	  The	  average	  between	  1905	  and	  1960	  was	  5%	  of	  GDP,	  and	  between	  1960	  and	  
1990	  was	  9%.	  The	  growth	  in	  participation	  was	  related	  to	  the	  transfers	  to	  the	  regions	  and	  in	  some	  cases,	  
large	  investments	  in	  infrastructure	  (transport,	  energy,	  and	  mining).	  Between	  1990	  and	  2003	  its	  share	  in	  GDP	  
has	  increased,	  which	  is	  mainly	  explained	  by	  the	  behavior	  of	  transfers	  (land,	  pensions	  and	  other)	  and	  interest	  
on	  debt.	  It	  is	  emphasized	  that	  the	  budget	  reforms	  have	  not	  had	  the	  expected	  success,	  in	  terms	  of	  flexibility	  
and	  reduce	  public	  expenditure	  in	  Colombia	  "(Junguito	  and	  Rincon	  2007).	  See	  also	  Junguito	  and	  Rincon	  (2007	  
b).	  	  
15	  The	  graph	  presents	  the	  data	  for	  the	  Central	  Government.	  	  
spending rises. In the long period from 1950 to 2002, government guidelines 
have been mixed, however, spending grows. 
Figure 1 
This contrast does not mean that government policies have been 
consistent. They were very dissimilar. An example of this is how the deficit 
evolved and, above all, how was financed. Fiscal policy is a key to 
understanding changes in the state, say Blinder and Solow (1974), because the 
arrangements for financing the deficit have important implications on debt and 
macroeconomic interactions. Since the fifties the instruments of fiscal policy 
have been very heterogeneous, and this has resulted in substantial changes in 
the size of the deficit and public debt management. 
 
Table 1 
In the fifties and sixties believed in state intervention and planning in the 
medium term16.  
After the 1991 Constitution was proposed to strengthen the rule of law in a 
secular context. Modernization of the State Constitution proposed by the 
measures emphasized inclusive. While Gaviria (1990-1994) and sought 
Hommes market incentives, the Constitution of 91 reaffirmed the 
appropriateness of the intervention. At the same time, the constituents of the 
91 claimed that proper monetary management an independent central bank is 
compatible with the expansionary policies that are usually necessary to ensure 
strengthening the Rule of Law17. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  The	  governments	  of	  Rojas,	  Lleras	  and	  Pastrana	  drove	  the	  state	  action.	  Lleras	  (1966-­‐1970)	  modernizing	  the	  
state	  apparatus.	  Administrative	  decentralization	  of	  1968	  is	  still	  relevant	  today.	  Despite	  the	  changes	  brought	  
about	  by	  regional	  decentralization,	  the	  basic	  scaffolding	  of	  the	  constitutional	  reform	  of	  1968	  still	  stands.	  
During	  the	  Pastrana	  government	  (1970-­‐1974)	  is	  a	  step	  backwards	  in	  terms	  of	  reform.	  The	  pact	  Chicoral	  
(1971)	  ended	  any	  hope	  of	  land	  distribution	  in	  the	  country.	  But	  The	  Four	  strategies,	  the	  development	  plan	  
incorporates	  Keynesian	  Pastrana,	  about	  the	  leading	  sectors	  (mainly	  construction)	  /.	  Lopez	  (1974-­‐1978)	  is	  to	  
liberalize	  the	  economy,	  and	  during	  these	  years	  public	  spending	  falls.	  Turbay	  (1978-­‐1982)	  takes	  Keynesian	  
elements.	  The	  National	  Integration	  Plan	  (DNP	  1979)	  seeks	  to	  develop	  energy	  infrastructure,	  roads	  and	  
communications.	  Since	  the	  late	  seventies	  governments	  in	  Colombia	  and	  the	  world,	  begin	  to	  suspect	  the	  
benefits	  of	  state	  action.	  
17	  Technocracy	  Government	  and	  offered	  a	  normative	  model	  that	  sought	  efficiency	  and	  passing	  by	  a	  decrease	  
in	  size	  of	  government.	  In	  reality	  did	  not	  happen,	  and	  government	  spending	  continued	  to	  grow	  /.	  The	  tight	  
The analytical framework to support this program was the theories of 
rational choice, methodological individualism or equilibrium analysis18. The 
fanaticism with which he fought against the state Gaviria forced to recognize 
that the reforms had been "oversold". 
International analysts share the premise retrospective of the 
development of Colombian macroeconomic stability over time. "Colombia has 
enjoyed an extraordinarily limited macroeconomic policy" (Robinson 
2007). While Latin America in general is irregular in macroeconomic 
management, the exception is filed by a "prudent fiscal policy to end." In 
terms of Ocampo (2004): "The tendency to being average is also a feature that 
is repeated when analyzing other economic and social indicators." It is 
interesting to examine how the macroeconomic management has been 
consistent with a systematic growth of state intervention19. 
Government intervention is still very important, although the adoption 
of regulations is very different. The state was withdrawing from areas 
formerly controlled. This transformation is the result of the way was 
transformed capitalism could not be contained in the logic of nation-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
monetary	  policy	  spurred	  increased	  interest	  rates,	  the	  dollar	  inflows	  and	  revaluation	  of	  the	  peso.	  This	  was	  
reflected	  in	  significant	  growth	  in	  imports.	  Samper	  (1994-­‐1998)	  seeks	  to	  correct	  the	  huge	  trade	  deficit	  and	  
stem	  the	  flow	  of	  dollars,	  but	  the	  process	  was	  reduced	  8000	  margins	  for	  maneuver	  and	  did	  not	  take	  radical	  
measures	  were	  necessary	  to	  reorient	  the	  economy.	  The	  two	  governments	  of	  Uribe	  (2000-­‐present)	  have	  
been	  lax	  in	  the	  monetary	  field,	  but	  this	  has	  been	  reflected	  in	  high	  inflation.	  The	  expansion	  of	  the	  means	  of	  
payment	  has	  not	  translated	  into	  higher	  prices.	  This	  "spirit	  Keynesian"	  has	  kept	  pace	  with	  increased	  public	  
spending.	  It	  is	  fairly	  complex	  state	  with	  certainty	  that	  the	  changes	  brought	  by	  the	  opening	  of	  the	  nineties	  
represented	  progress	  and	  deviations	  of	  the	  Colombian	  state	  were	  caused	  by	  the	  incomplete	  nature	  of	  the	  
reforms	  introduced	  by	  the	  market	  (Hommes	  1998).	  Hommes	  and	  Gaviria	  are	  part	  of	  a	  more	  general	  
theoretical	  approach	  that	  seeks	  to	  dispense	  with	  the	  State	  in	  all	  those	  activities	  in	  which	  the	  market	  may	  be	  
present.	  The	  idea	  behind	  this	  logic	  is	  that	  governments	  are	  unable	  to	  adopt	  the	  right	  policies	  for	  
development	  and	  economic	  growth	  
18	  On	  this	  subject,	  see	  Colclough	  and	  Manor	  (1994).	  
19	  The	  relevant	  point	  is	  that	  despite	  the	  diversity	  of	  economic	  policies,	  public	  spending	  kept	  the	  pace	  up.	  It	  
seems	  as	  if	  the	  heterogeneity	  of	  the	  policies	  did	  not	  have	  enough	  strength	  to	  influence	  the	  evolution	  of	  
expenditure.	  The	  expenditure	  share	  of	  GDP	  is	  insensitive	  to	  changes	  in	  policy	  direction.	  This	  observation	  
raises	  important	  interpretive	  challenges	  Actual	  performance	  of	  the	  markets	  shows	  that	  government	  
intervention	  is	  absolutely	  necessary.	  The	  processes	  of	  industrialization	  could	  not	  have	  been	  consolidated	  
without	  government	  intervention,	  protecting,	  subsidizing	  or	  serving	  as	  an	  entrepreneur.	  Hodgson's	  phrase	  
(1999,	  p.	  82)	  is	  very	  telling:	  "...	  model	  even	  under	  the	  assumption	  of	  "free	  market"	  in	  the	  United	  States	  
economy	  during	  the	  nineteenth	  and	  twentieth	  centuries,	  there	  was	  a	  systematic	  state	  intervention".	  
state. Faced with the transformations of contemporary capitalism, the national 
framework was too narrow20. 
In most Asian economies is undeniable that its development was led by 
the state. If we look at the participation that public spending in GDP of the 
countries of Western Europe, Canada, New Zealand or the United States, there 
is reason to believe that the state and specific social formation has been 




The growth of the state can also be seen from the perspective of public 
employment. Vatter and Walker (1986) believe that Wagner's law can also 
look in the light of the evolution of public employment. The evolution of 
public employment is presented in Figure 2 and Table 222. The series was 
published by the Commission for the Rationalization of Public Expenditure 
(1997). As explained in the report, the Commission had great difficulty in 
gathering relevant information.The study (Estrada / Gonzalez / Pérez, 2008), 
recommends that the Dane return to employment statistics and wage 
public. Despite the slowdown in growth, the trend is positive. As the 
Commission noted the number does not include employment outside plant, 
which has increased significantly. 
 
Table 2 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  "State	  control	  over	  space	  and	  time	  are	  increasingly	  outweighed	  by	  global	  flows	  of	  capital,	  goods,	  services,	  
technology,	  communication	  and	  power.	  The	  capture	  by	  the	  state,	  historical	  time	  through	  its	  appropriation	  of	  
tradition	   and	   the	   (re)	   construction	   of	   national	   identity	   is	   challenged	   by	   plural	   identities	   defined	   by	  
autonomous	   subjects.	   The	   State's	   attempt	   to	   reassert	   its	   power	   in	   the	   global	   supranational	   institutions	  
develop	   further	   undermines	   its	   sovereignty	   and	   its	   efforts	   to	   restore	   the	   legitimacy	   decentralizing	  
administrative	  power	  strengthens	  regional	  and	  local	  centrifugal	  trends,	  to	  bring	  citizens	  to	  the	  government	  
but	   increase	   distrust	   of	   the	   nation-­‐state.	   Thus,	   while	   global	   capitalism	   thrives	   and	   exploit	   nationalist	  
ideologies	  throughout	  the	  world,	  the	  nation-­‐state,	  as	  established	  in	  the	  early	  modern	  history,	  seems	  to	  be	  
losing	  its	  power,	  though,	  and	  this	  is	  essential	  no	  influence	  "(Castells	  2000,	  p.	  72).	  
21	  "...	  if	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  relationship	  between	  multinational	  enterprises	  and	  the	  state,	  include	  the	  wide	  
range	  of	  policies	  through	  which	  nation	  states	  can	  use	  their	  regulatory	  powers	  to	  facilitate	  or	  block	  
movements	  of	  capital,	  labor,	  information	  and	  goods,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  at	  this	  point	  in	  history,	  the	  fading	  of	  the	  
nation	  state	  is	  a	  fallacy	  "(Castells	  2000,	  p.	  72).	  
22	  The	  data	  cover	  the	  payroll	  staff.	  
The composition of the public sector has changed 
significantly. Increased hiring in the areas of justice and defense has offset the 
reduced use of some institutions23. 
Figure 3 
The second explanation is related to the increasing complexity of markets and 
social interactions. New forms of regulation are manifest in increased social 
spending. The intervention methods have diversified significantly in the last 
20 years24. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  	  (Figure	  3),	  between	  1976	  and	  1995	  the	  share	  of	  public	  employment	  in	  the	  total	  rose	  from	  9.3%	  to	  7.6%.	  
This	  ratio	  is	  very	  low	  compared	  with	  other	  countries.	  In	  France,	  for	  example,	  almost	  one	  third	  of	  the	  jobs	  is	  
public.	  The	   theory	  of	  public	   finance	  has	  played	  a	  very	  different	  way	   the	  presence	  of	   the	  Wagner	  Act.	  The	  
first	   reason	   for	   the	  growing	   trend	  of	  public	   spending	   is	   the	   increasing	  demands	  of	   society.	   In	  many	   social	  
services	  are	  increasing	  marginal	  costs.	  The	  most	  obvious	  case	  is	  that	  of	  health.	  Marginal	  cost	  increases	  as	  life	  
expectancy	  increases.	  The	  marginal	  cost	  is	  advancing	  at	  exponential	  rates.	  Going	  from	  75	  years	  to	  76	  has	  a	  
much	   higher	  marginal	   cost	   to	   go	   from	   30	   to	   40	   years.	   If	   the	   demands	   of	   the	   population	   increase,	   public	  
spending	  increases.	  
24	  The	  heterogeneities	  are	  remarkable.	  We	  mention	  a	  few.	  The	  relationship	  between	  public	  and	  private,	  the	  
forms	  of	   interaction	  has	  changed	  substantially.	  The	  styles	  of	  award,	  for	  example,	  more	  and	  more	  different	  
and	  cover	  different	  industries.	  Concessions	  have	  been	  fimado	  airports,	  education,	  roads,	  transportation,	  TV,	  
telecommunications,	   etc..	   And	   besides,	   have	   created	   new	   laws	   that	   force	   private	   resources	   allocated	   to	  
specific	  purposes.	  The	  most	  significant	  has	  been	  the	   financing	  of	  health	  and	  social	   security.	  The	  resources	  
administered	  by	  the	  private	  sector	  are	  important.	  Pension	  funds	  are	  managing	  $	  50	  billion.	  This	  amount	  of	  
savings	   has	   important	   macroeconomic	   implications.	   Financial	   savings	   can	   be	   used	   to	   finance	   productive	  
activities	   or	   simply	   to	   feed	   the	   bubble.	   In	   practice	   this	   latter	   path	   has	   prevailed.	   These	   transactions	   are	  
constitutive	  of	  fiscal	  policy	  in	  the	  sense	  defined	  by	  Blinder	  and	  Solow	  (1974).	  For	  these	  authors,	  fiscal	  policy	  
is	  relevant	  for	  its	  impact	  on	  public	  debt	  and	  not	  for	  its	  amount.	  And	  the	  transactions	  are	  conducted	  with	  the	  
pension	  savings,	  affect	  the	  structure	  of	  capital	  markets	  and,	  therefore,	  the	  way	  it	  determines	  the	  conditions	  
of	   the	   debt.	   Pension	   funds	   are	   institutional	   holders	   of	   TES	   that	   are	   major	   players	   in	   the	   market.	   The	  
interactions	   that	  start	  with	   the	   legal	   requirement	   to	   transfer	   to	  private	  entities	   to	  pay	  social	   security,	  and	  
ending	  with	  the	  financial	  investments	  are	  complex	  and	  multicausal	  erratic.	  It	  is	  then	  possible	  to	  define	  causal	  
relationships	  that	  are	  direct	  and	  linear.	  This	  conclusion	  has	  three	  substantive	  implications.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  
questions	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  an	  intervention	  focused	  on	  fine-­‐tuning.	  Moreover,	  the	  multiple	  highlights	  the	  
impossibility	  of	   fixing	  unidirectional	   linear	  sequences.	  And	  finally,	   the	   information	  provided	  by	  the	  Dane	   is	  
insufficient	   to	   keep	   track	   of	   the	   relationships	  mentioned.	   The	   payroll	   taxes	   are	   another	   form	   of	   transfer	  
required	  by	   law.	  These	  provisions	  are	  to	  private	  (Workers'	  Compensation),	  manage	  resources	  that	  will	  not	  
come	   for	   the	   private,	   but	   normative.	   These	   types	   of	   government	   intervention	   are	   illustrative	   only,	   but	  
highlight	   the	   heterogeneous	   nature	   of	   state	   action.	   In	   some	   cases	   it	   has	   even,	   to	   turn	   to	   the	   private	   tax	  
collection.	  Contemporary	   societies	  have	  come	   to	  accept,	   in	   fact,	   that	   the	  market	  has	   inherent	   limitations.	  
And	   therefore,	   that	   government	   involvement	   is	   necessary.	   Regulatory	   commissions	   fulfill	   these	   oversight	  
functions	  on	  market	  processes.	  The	  market	  fails	  to	  resolve	  substantive	  issues	  such	  as	  efficiency	  and	  equity.	  
These	  dimensions	   do	  not	   converge	   through	  market	   dynamics.	   The	   regulatory	   state	   has	   the	   force	  without	  
having	  removed	  the	  interventionist	  state.	  Both	  live.	  In	  fact,	  they	  have	  always	  lived.	  The	  bottom	  line	  indicates	  
that	  the	  state's	  share	   increases	  substantially.	  Not	  only	  for	  the	  public	  spending	  side,	  but	  also	  because	  have	  
the	  regulatory	  functions	  expanded	  considerably.	  Wagner's	  law	  also	  explains	  why	  people	  prefer	  this	  to	  future	  
well-­‐being.	  This	  principle	   is	  expressed	   in	  a	   forceful	  way	  Böhm-­‐Bawerk	   (1895).	  For	   reasons	   that	   the	  author	  
Here's another aspect of the state of the State on monetary 
policy. Financial internationalization and trade in services and trade have led 
to new forms of intervention. Although the series statistics do not capture 
changes Dane intrinsic monetary policy, it is feasible to look at the trends of 
public credit. The characteristics of monetary policy can be better analyzed 
with information from Bank of the Republic. With information on the Dane 
we know the relative weight of public debt; this information is certainly 
valuable to know the general structure of spending. 
In Gonzalez (2006) argues that Colombia failed to build a welfare 
economy (welfare), and has not been able to structure an economy of war 
(warfare). The Uribe administration promoted the war machine, but the 
national economy was far from being qualified as a war economy, with the 
classical terms (Table 3). 
 
Tables 3 and 4 
It must be remembered that the data do not exist in order 
Dane. Urdaneta and Betancur constructed the series. Gonzalez (2006) shows 
that in the United States introduced the category "war Keynesianism", in order 
to make explicit the impact that finances (income and expenditure) of the war 
in economic activity. In the United States during World War II, between 1939 
and 1944, the share of public employment in total employment rose from 16% 
to 35%. And defense spending as a percentage of GDP rose from 2% to 44% 
(Stiglitz 2000, p. 30 and 40). In Colombia we have no economy of welfare 
(welfare), or economy of war (warfare). None has been consolidated 
In 2004 the order of priorities was as follows: public debt service 
(10.8% of GDP)25, security and social assistance (7.56%), education (5.49%), 
economic services (4.52%), general public services (4.05%), health (3.65), 
defense (2.53%), public order, security and justice (1.95%), housing and urban 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
associated	  with	   the	   human	   condition,	   the	   preference	   for	   present	   satisfaction	   pressed	   increases	   in	   public	  
spending.	  In	  the	  tax	  literature	  speaks	  of	  Keynesian	  populism.	  Governments	  are	  tempted	  to	  offer	  goods	  and	  
services	   or	   to	   issue	   currency,	   in	   order	   to	   gain	   popularity	   or	   to	   extend	   its	   mandate.	   In	   this	   way	   end	   up	  
pandering	  to	  the	  pressures	  of	  the	  governed.	  
25	  Debt	  has	  continued	  to	  increase.	  In	  2004	  the	  public	  debt	  service	  reached	  $	  11	  billion.	  Now	  exceeds	  $	  16	  
billion.	  
(0.49%), other social services (0.43%). If we add defense, public order, 
security and justice, the percentage is 4.58%. According to Isaza and Campos 
(2007), current military spending ($ 22.2 billion) represents 6.5% of 
GDP26. The defense and security spending began to increase in the second half 
of the eighties, when escalated the drug war. However, it was also from the 
nineties when the more general struggle against the various manifestations of 
violence was reflected in an upward spiral of spending. 
The importance of social protection should be viewed from a broader 
perspective. Contemporary societies have had to travel a long road of 
problems that involves government spending, privatization, joint participation, 
nationalization or failure and market information. Health care absorbs a 
growing share of public spending. And why are increasing the risks of social 
protection system reaches a critical state (Fitoussi 1995). These 
transformations have been most evident in recent years. The series is available 
in expenditure by purpose (1970-1994) no significant changes (Table 5). 
 
 
The restructuring of the state also can be seen on the side of employment. In 
1995 the employment level at the national central represented 36.4% of total 
public sector employment and 36.1% of wage costs. Table 7 includes all 
entities of the national central level (Table 7). 
Tables 7, 8 and 9 show a gradual concentration of employment in a few 
entities. Table 9 encapsulates the dual entities that own 90% of employment 
(Expenditure Rationalization Committee 1997). In 1995, teachers, military, 
police, judiciary and the Attorney General's Office gathered over 90% of 
employment included in Table 9, equivalent to 57.35% of total public sector 
employment. The concentration process is caused by the increase of force 
(military police) and an increased number of staff in the institutions 
responsible for justice. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  U.S.	  military	  spending	  equal	  to	  4.04%	  of	  GDP,	  and	  in	  European	  countries	  that	  are	  part	  of	  the	  Nato	  2%	  
(Isaza	  and	  Campos	  2007,	  p.	  4).	  
Figure 5 shows the dynamics that have had tax revenues of the nation, 
the central level. Junguito and Rincon (2007 b) show that in recent years the 
government tax burden is at the highest level of a century (14% of GDP), after 
presenting averages of 4% of GDP between 1905 and 1949, and 6% of GDP 
between 1950 and 1984. Colombia raises relatively little, if we compare the 
basic tax rates with the international (Ocampo 2007). 
 
Figure 6 
Fiscal policy has chosen to distribute by way of spending, rather than by 
way of taxes. Public expenditure has an impact on inequality 5 times more 
than the taxes (Gonzalez 1998). One explanation for the low distributive 
capacity of the tax may be the lag in the face of direct taxes and indirect 
evolution (Figure 6)27. Over time indirect taxation has been gaining 
importance, and this has clear implications for redistribution. Income taxes 
have not been very progressive. They have a weak progressive tax. And 
indirect taxes tend to be flat (with respect to income, each decile pays a 
similar proportion). These features of the tax system show that the Colombian 
State has given up the task-side distributive taxes and opted rather for public 
expenditure (education, health, benefits, etc.). This decision has less political 
costs. 
The tax has been more dynamic VAT, which was created with the 1983 
reform to replace the outdated sales tax. With this tax burden implemented 
fiscal measures to control retail trade. Your basic rate rose from 10% set in 
1983 and in force until 1990, 14% in 1993 and 16% in the 1995 tax reform - 
which, with a temporary reduction in 1999 remains true today (Table 10). 
The income tax has been relatively limited. In the first decade of this century 
reached a peak of 37.5% with the 2003 reform, but subsequently fell to settle 
at 33%. But at the same time, fiscal policy was filled with new beneficiaries, 
tax exemptions in affluent sectors of the economy. Table 10 summarizes the 
main tax rules that have been issued in the historical evolution of the state in 
Colombia. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  The	  figure	  5	  is	  the	  sum	  of	  direct	  and	  indirect	  taxes	  in	  Figure	  6.	  
 
Table 10 
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, information from 
regional and departmental accounts was precarious. The lack of information 
reflects a type of state with weak links between central and regional micro 
powers. This combination generated abnormal impact imbalances in the tax 
structure. In the second half of the twentieth century were identified serious 
problems in the periphery, and instability of the central dominant. From the 
economic point of view this type of state was far from the economic ideals 
touted by the Physiocrats, with a regional restructuring stemming from deep 
social conflicts. 
In the first half of the state does not have enough tax instruments, and 
exposed to a weak regional and territorial control. But in addition, the state 
struggles to correct to the best of the breaks required adjustment and recession 
caused by World War II. We do not count in the first half of the twentieth 
century with a Hobbesian state in conditions of absolute conflict and war. The 
regional tax (departments and municipalities) lost importance in an 
accelerated manner within the country's total tax. Between 1930 and 2000 its 
share fell from 45% to about 20%. 
After eighty Colombia have had fourteen major tax reforms, including 
two in the eighties (1983 and 1986), eight in the nineties (two in 1990, 1992, 
1993, 1994, 1995, two in 1998), and four during the new century (2000, two 
in 2002 and 2003). With the exception of Act 49 of 1990, all have had the 
purpose to increase the levels of taxation, either with rising rates, base 
broadening or reduction of tax benefits. These reforms have been disordered, 
incoherent, fragmented, and not framed in a broader context that allows them 




The comparative analysis performed on the balances in tax allows us to review 
the relevance of some hypotheses. Throughout the twentieth century, 
governments have used different instruments to achieve exceptional state 
revenue targets and spending time critical tax and for which approval was not 
necessary to go through Congress. This decision was in any event more 
successful in the field with the income tax expense. In Colombia we have 
failed to develop a type of welfare state that is capable of achieving fiscal 
balance through progressive income and expenses. Third, the state that reflects 
the management of changes in tax regulations is a state with a driving trend, 
but at the same time, minimal state. 
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Gastos e ingresos totales del Gobierno Nacional 
Central.  Porcentaje del PIB (1950-2002) 
 
La línea negra corresponde al gasto, y la roja a los 
ingresos. 
 
Fuente: Cálculos de los autores a partir del Dane y del 




Ingresos y gastos del sector ppúblico no financiero (% PIB) 
 
  71 - 74 75 - 78 79 - 82 83 - 86 87 - 90 91 - 94 95 - 98 99 - 02 03 - 05 
Gastos           
Gastos de consumo del 
gobierno 9.6 8.0 9.4 9.6 8.9 10.4 15.2 17.6 14.3 
Seguridad y asistencia social 1.9 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.0 3.8 5.0 5.8 6.2 
En dinero 0.7 0.8 1.1 1.4 1.5 2.0 2.3 2.9 3.9 
En especie (salud) 0.7 0.7 0.8 1.0 0.9 1.1 1.8 1.9 1.3 
Otras prestaciones 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.0 
Inversión  5.5 6.2 6.9 7.9 7.1 7.0 7.5 6.5 6.7 
Adm.  públicas 3.2 3.3 3.4 2.8 3.0 3.4 4.5 3.6 4.4 
Empresas públicas 2.4 2.9 3.5 5.0 4.1 3.6 3.0 3.0 2.3 
Gasto primario 17.2 16.3 18.8 20.5 19.1 21.0 26.7 28.6 26.2 
Intereses netos pagados 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.9 0.7 1.3 3.3 4.2 
Gasto Total 17.7 16.7 19.4 21.3 20.0 21.7 28.1 31.9 30.4 
Ingresos          
Impuestos. regalías y tasas 12.0 13.9 11.9 11.9 13.6 15.4 15.8 17.8 19.4 
A la renta 4.6 4.4 2.9 2.3 3.2 5.2 4.7 5.3 6.7 
Otros. netos de subsidios 7.3 9.5 8.9 9.4 9.9 9.5 10.4 11.4 11.6 
Regalías 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.8 1.1 1.1 
Contr. a la seguridad social 2.5 2.5 3.0 3.3 3.3 4.0 5.4 4.8 4.2 
Util. emp. y rentas capital 0.9 0.1 0.7 1.7 2.2 3.2 4.3 5.1 4.6 
Intereses de la seg. social 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 1.0 0.8 0.4 
Ingresos totales 15.5 16.7 15.7 17.1 19.3 22.9 26.5 28.6 28.6 
          
Superavit (+) o déficit (-) -2.2 0.0 -3.6 -4.3 -0.7 1.1 -1.6 -3.3 -1.8 







































76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 
 
El eje vertical representa el número de empleados públicos (miles de 
personas) bajo nómina; es decir, efectivamente contratados. Incluye: 
² Orden nacional, niveles central y descentralizado 
² Orden departamental, niveles central y descentralizado 
² Orden municipal, municipios capitales, niveles central y 
descentralizado. No incluye los funcionarios de los municipios no 
capitales de departamento 
² Docentes 
² Servicios Seccionales de Salud 
² Juntas Administradoras de Deportes 
 
Fuente: Comisión de Racionalización del Gasto Público (1997).  
Chenery, Ocampo, Ramírez (1986).  A partir de 1985 los valores 
corresponden a la última columna del cuadro 2. 
 
	  Cuadro 2 
 
Total empleo público (1985-1995) 
 
 Central Descent Central Descent Mpios Descent Docentes Ser Sec. Jun. Ad. Total 
 Nacional Nacional Deptal Deptal Capital Mpal  Salud Deporte  
           
85 244620 158741 49267 27243 37725 40023 208869 17189 1784 785461 
86 274689 158009 51416 29633 37880 41273 211065 17021 1694 822680 
87 286084 169211 52668 34302 38445 40126 215547 23684 1706 861773 
88 318940 173903 56190 37942 38452 45235 215608 19995 1482 907747 
89 308983 170289 57055 40486 42874 46634 221195 21681 1471 910668 
90 321760 173830 55113 40073 45729 47904 224734 25670 1489 936302 
91 319864 150718 53443 39443 44166 51311 246806 25906 1794 933451 
92 337919 148362 53818 39872 46062 56112 236445 26857 1770 947217 
93 337525 138278 50992 39850 54582 60190 234781 18479 1769 936446 
94 347482 138110 48166 39840 60810 64113 231992 13186 1241 944940 
95 340491 137942 47265 39832 54666 64350 236269 13195 1253 935263 
 
No cobija a los funcionarios de los municipios no capitales de departamento. 
 
Fuente: Comisión de Racionalización del Gasto Público (1997).  Contraloría General de la 
República; Departamento Administrativo de la Función Pública; Ministerio de Defensa; Ministerio 
de Educación; Ministerio de Hacienda; DNP - Misión Social; DANE-MEN (C-600). Además, 


























Participación (%) del empleo público en el 








76 79 82 85 88 91 94  
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
76 = 9.3; 77 = 9.4; 78 = 9.3; 79 = 9.4; 80 = 9.5; 81 = 
9.6; 82 = 9.5; 83 = 9.4; 84 = 9.1; 85 = 9.0; 86 = 9.1; 
87 = 8.9; 88 = 9.1; 89 = 8.7; 90 = 9.0; 91 = 8.4; 92 = 
8.3; 93 = 8.0; 94 = 7.9; 95 = 7.7 
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
El dato de empleo público fue tomado del cuadro 2. 
El empleo total corresponde al número de personas 
remuneradas - total nacional -, según el DANE. 
 





Distribución del gasto del sector público consolidado por finalidades.  Millones de pesos 
corrientes 
 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
         
Servicios públ. gener. 6.611.805 7.442.802 8.666.119 7.174.702 7.599.717 9.040.977 9.191.423 10.333.585 
Orden públ. seg. justic.  3.560.202 3.470.398 4.078.174 3.476.753 3.707.492 4.030.395 4.596.965 4.982.778 
Defensa 2.352.171 2.538.317 1.709.667 4.205.669 4.473.490 5.289.157 5.968.444 6.460.887 
Educación 4.678.944 6.793.029 7.828.156 8.159.728 10.489.908 11.221.853 12.450.906 13.992.201 
Sanidad 3.408.465 4.204.837 4.927.681 6.029.721 6.866.101 7.162.517 8.251.326 9.306.328 
Segur.y asist. social 8.317.098 8.894.082 9.476.750 12.215.826 12.709.594 15.322.252 16.178.632 19.272.594 
Vivi. y orden, urb-rural 683.159 941.327 818.721 1.363.897 1.336.852 1.063.220 948.730 1.239.940 
Otros serv. sociales 503.139 560.881 610.004 841.112 704.323 870.491 983.808 1.099.605 
Ser. econ. y otras final. 5.886.623 5.978.145 5.114.338 8.105.318 4.661.976 5.156.358 9.996.673 11.519.058 
Servicio deuda pública 7.912.705 10.800.697 12.714.534 17.310.753 25.382.290 27.216.273 26.736.872 27.639.893 
 |        
Total 43.914.311 51.624.515 55.944.144 68.883.478 77.931.742 86.373.492 95.303.779 105.846.870 
 
Incluye el conjunto del sector público (Nación, departamentos, municipios, institutos, etc.) 
 






Distribución del gasto del sector público consolidado por finalidades.  Porcentaje del 
PIB 
 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
         
Servicios públicos generales  5.43 5.3 5.72 4.10 4.03 4.44 4.01 4.05 
Orden público seguridad y justicia  2.93 2.47 2.69 1.99 1.97 1.98 2.01 1.95 
Defensa 1.93 1.81 1.13 2.40 2.37 2.60 2.60 2.53 
Educación 3.84 4.84 5.16 4.67 5.56 5.52 5.43 5.49 
Sanidad 2.80 2.99 3.25 3.45 3.64 3.52 3.60 3.65 
Seguridad y asistencia social 6.83 6.33 6.25 6.98 6.74 7.53 7.06 7.56 
Vivienda y ordenación urbana y rural 0.56 0.67 0.54 0.78 0.71 0.52 0.41 0.49 
Otros servicios sociales 0.41 0.40 0.40 0.48 0.37 0.43 0.43 0.43 
Servic. Económicos y otras final. 4.84 4.26 3.37 4.63 2.47 2.53 4.36 4.52 
Servicio deuda pública 6.50 7.70 8.41 9.90 13.50 13.41 11.71 10.80 
         
Total 36.08 36.75 36.91 39.39 41.33 42.45 41.58 41.49 
 










Gasto de la Administración Pública - Millones de pesos corrientes 
 
Gasto por Finalidad 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
Adm.  pública general 3.991 4.933 5.643 7.411 8.750 11.350 14.256 18.110 24.670 36.624 
Defensa 1.775 3.781 2.203 2.399 2.958 3.893 4.311 5.986 8.112 11.376 
Educación 3.917 4.975 6.370 8.321 10.796 13.407 16.457 20.720 27.539 34.888 
Salud y sanidad 1.375 1.569 1.793 2.294 2.972 3.949 4.274 5.143 6.772 10.070 
Seg. y asistencia social 2.814 3.927 4.228 5.670 6.748 9.096 11.888 17.326 26.081 35.042 
Viv. orden. urbana y rural 613 738 917 1.379 1.209 1.452 1.719 2.428 2.383 2.717 
Serv. cultur. y recreativos 150 119 110 2.067 470 738 903 1.171 1.548 2.409 
Servicios económicos 7.198 8.066 8.657 12.924 14.289 9.982 19.639 42.693 46.113 51.301 
Deuda pública  1.350 1.430 1.887 2.219 2.969 7.650 3.445 3.878 5.320 6.089 
Total 23.183 29.538 31.808 44.684 51.161 61.517 76.892 117.455 148.538 190.516 
Fuente: Dane 
	  
Continuación cuadro 5 
 
Gasto de la Administración Pública - Millones de pesos corrientes 
 
Gasto por Finalidad 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Adm.  pública general 51.952 70.313 91.756 119.876 149.664 188.929 246.743 349.455 
Defensa 16.930 20.258 24.561 36.238 44.050 62.981 74.877 99.124 
Educación 49.274 63.494 84.733 103.030 140.053 172.295 223.067 296.964 
Salud y sanidad 16.925 21.868 28.597 37.915 38.905 61.821 75.052 106.299 
Seg. y asistencia social 49.349 70.211 65.377 76.663 103.762 122.543 161.507 284.253 
Viv. orden. urbana y rural 5.576 5.427 8.814 11.082 9.939 9.963 19.647 28.394 
Serv. cultur. y recreativos 2.890 3.047 3.970 23.085 7.238 9.614 13.146 23.338 
Servicios económicos 76.648 128.399 147.206 163.028 202.049 263.399 233.313 533.561 
Deuda pública  9.835 14.452 22.766 23.210 33.635 35.943 67.970 124.493 










Continuación cuadro 5 
 
Gasto de la Administración Pública - Millones de pesos corrientes 
 
Gasto por Finalidad 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Adm.  pública general 436.611 574.527 790.220 997.558 1.411.172 1.770.711 3.554.154 
Defensa 150.194 211.388 253.600 324.686 469.740 587.544 814.738 
Educación 373.350 477.017 604.302 803.819 1.094.197 1.403.663 1.890.498 
Salud y sanidad 135.519 185.109 237.914 295.922 356.434 686.792 1.297.821 
Seg. y asistencia social 305.398 429.177 586.737 805.606 1.145.649 1.561.784 3.097.060 
Viv. orden. urbana y rural 29.944 43.603 63.934 115.130 139.585 194.008 266.579 
Serv. cultur. y recreativos 27.127 35.090 54.695 69.067 77.822 130.471 205.900 
Servicios económicos 576.282 750.974 952.395 1.285.874 1.670.912 2.186.825 2.806.047 
Deuda pública  125.443 156.413 245.599 321.078 372.542 668.056 675.487 






Gasto de la Administración Pública - Porcentaje del PIB 
 
Gasto por Finalidad 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
Adm.  pública general 2.5 3.0 2.5 2.6 2.3 2.4 2.3 2.1 2.3 2.6 
Defensa 1.1 2.0 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 
Educación 2.5 3.0 2.8 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.6 2.4 2.5 2.5 
Salud y sanidad 0.9 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.7 
Seg. y asistencia social 1.8 2.0 1.9 2.0 1.8 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.4 2.5 
Viv. orden. urbana y rural 0.4 0 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 
Serv. cultur. y recreativos 0.1 0 0.0 0.7 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 
Servicios económicos 4.6 4.1 3.8 4.5 3.7 2.1 3.1 5.0 4.3 3.6 
Deuda pública  0.9 1.1 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 





	  Continuación cuadro 6 
 
 Gasto de la Administración Pública - Porcentaje del PIB 
 
Gasto por Finalidad 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Adm.  pública general 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.2 3.6 3.4 5.3 
Defensa 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.2 1.1 1.2 
Educación 2.7 2.7 2.5 2.6 2.8 2.7 2.8 
Salud y sanidad 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.3 1.9 
Seg. y asistencia social 2.2 2.4 2.4 2.6 2.9 3.0 4.6 
Viv. orden. urbana y rural 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Serv. cultur. y recreativos 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 
Servicios económicos 4.1 4.2 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.2 4.2 
Deuda pública  0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.3 1.0 
Total 15.5 15.9 15.8 16.1 17.0 17.6 21.6 
Fuente: Dane 
	  
Continuación cuadro 6 
 
 Gasto de la Administración Pública - Porcentaje del PIB 
 
Gasto por Finalidad 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
Adm.  pública general 2.8 3.0 3.1 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.1 3.3 
Defensa 0.9 0.9 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.1 0.9 0.9 
Educación 2.6 2.7 2.9 2.8 3.1 2.9 2.8 2.8 
Salud y sanidad 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.8 1.0 0.9 1.0 
Seg. y asistencia social 2.6 3.0 2.2 2.1 2.3 2.1 2.0 2.7 
Viv. orden. urbana y rural 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 
Serv. cultur. y recreativos 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Servicios económicos 4.1 5.5 5.0 4.5 4.4 4.5 2.9 5.1 
Deuda pública  0.5 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.8 1.2 



























Gasto de la Administración Pública por 
finalidades (servicios económicos), educación, 
salud y seguridad social.  Porcentaje del PIB 
(1970-1994) 
 
La curva superior (roja) corresponde a servicios 
económicos.  La curva de la mitad (verde) es el 
gasto público en educación.  Y la curva inferior (azul) 
corresponde a los gastos en salud y seguridad 
social. 
 




Empleo público, número de personas - Orden nacional, nivel central (1985-1995) 
 
 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
            
Fuer. Mil. - Pie fuerza 
- 
86860 95684 110089 129155 113628 127397 125615 126219 131273 136911 145636 
Pol. Nac. - Pie fuerza 
- 
60512 63231 65895 67715 71072 71950 75629 82551 82769 92159 90683 
Rama Judicial 17779 18723 22809 22809 22538 21255 19457 19534 20295 20325 20916 
Fisc. General - - - - - - - 8564 8815 15494 18692 
Fuer. Mil. -Adminis- 11935 18366 11996 11994 13044 12886 12868 13046 15837 17532 14880 
Min. de Hacienda 12914 12930 10927 10970 11348 9264 8350 10423 7175 7320 8086 
Dep/to  de Seguridad 4419 5820 5771 5503 5396 6152 5848 5649 6116 7542 6450 
Pol. Nacional - 
Admini- 
6524 6511 6443 6804 6800 7017 5121 7249 7267 7786 6368 
Contr. Gen. de la 
Rep. 
9914 9883 9585 9465 9792 9419 10258 8832 6018 3873 4486 
Reg. Nal. del 
Est.Civil 
3318 12588 8004 13578 13835 13597 14604 14604 19180 16960 3380 
Proc. Gen. de la 
Nación 
2117 2350 2281 2213 2551 3939 3939 2712 2821 2898 2834 
Congreso de la Rep. 2574 2574 3550 2847 2557 2559 2559 2183 2323 2322 2550 
Super. de Notariado 240 240 240 254 326 326 326 326 300 2287 2296 
Ministerio de Salud 934 988 957 920 946 915 943 3034 2377 2347 1377 
Min.de Trabajo 1313 1315 1273 1322 1339 1339 1405 1399 1180 1218 1357 
Min. de Rel. Exter. 1093 1093 997 993 1030 1010 1085 1177 1238 1496 1310 
Min. de Transporte 2709 2600 5666 12035 11657 10982 10652 9324 5623 1023 1013 
Super. Bancaria 788 788 788 803 803 803 777 777 634 689 746 
Min. del Medio Amb. - - - - - - - - - 299 637 
Ministerio del Interior 394 394 365 374 443 443 432 451 542 544 576 
Dep/to Nal. de 
Planeac. 
388 388 426 429 496 542 550 558 608 558 538 
Ministerio de 
Educación 
1120 1121 965 951 903 1070 1070 1907 539 575 535 
DANE 1191 1179 1150 1159 1146 1157 1138 1087 1064 537 516 
Min. de Comunicac. 455 450 450 455 449 454 461 453 456 500 510 
Presidencia de la Rep. 309 289 433 497 528 686 503 514 539 600 493 
Ministerio de Minas 433 433 416 511 507 512 481 475 401 474 475 
Dep/to  de 
Cooperativas 
436 447 462 462 469 466 466 448 453 443 457 
Super. de Sociedades 366 366 366 484 484 484 484 74 310 311 382 
Ministerio de Justicia 7223 7116 6957 7117 7450 7525 7565 6906 7442 356 343 
Min. de Agricultura 502 503 508 343 425 431 390 385 418 266 274 
Dep/to de la Func. 
Públ. 
250 251 241 253 282 285 276 268 263 249 247 
Min. de Com. 
Exterior 
- - - - - - - 181 195 291 223 
Super. de Ind. y Com. 225 225 225 290 290 290 290 290 185 213 216 
Super. de Salud 98 98 98 98 98 148 148 148 226 181 181 
Super. de Ser. 
Públicos 
- - - - - - - - - 245 180 
Super. de Valores - - - - - - - 121 154 154 180 
Ministerio de 
Desarrollo 
90 90 90 104 127 185 194 166 178 187 179 
Super. de Vig. 
Seg.Priv. 
- - - - - - - - 194 194 134 
Super. de Sub. 
Familiar 
62 62 62 62 62 62 62 45 56 56 79 
Super. de Puertos - - - - - - - 68 68 68 76 
Ofic. de Reg. de IIPP. 1679 1679 1679 1921 1952 1952 1952 1952 1940 - - 
Veeduría del Tesoro - - - - - - - 15 55 - - 
Dep/to de Aer. Civil 3111 3564 3553 3683 3844 3886 3713 3553 - - - 
Dep/to de Intend.y 
Com. 
99 106 121 121 123 123 - - - - - 
Fonade 61 59 61 62 63 70 74 72 - - - 
Super. de Camb. 185 185 185 185 180 180 180 180 - - - 
            
TOTAL 244620 274689 286084 318940 308983 321760 319864 337919 337525 347482 340491 
 
Las entidades están ordenadas en función del número de empleados públicos que tenían en 1995. 
 






Empleo público - Participación (%) de cada entidad en el total - Orden nacional, nivel central, más 
docentes (1985-1995) 
 
  1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
            
Docentes 46.1 43.5 43.0 40.3 41.7 41.1 43.6 41.2 41.0 40.0 41.0 
Fuer. Milit. - Pie fuerza - 19.2 19.7 21.9 24.2 21.4 23.3 22.2 22.0 22.9 23.6 25.3 
Policía Nacional - Pie fuerza - 13.3 13.0 13.1 12.7 13.4 13.2 13.3 14.4 14.5 15.9 15.7 
Rama Judicial 3.9 3.9 4.5 4.3 4.3 3.9 3.4 3.4 3.5 3.5 3.6 
Fiscalía General de la Nación - - - - - - - 1.5 1.5 2.7 3.2 
Fuer. Milit. -Adminis- 2.6 3.8 2.4 2.2 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.8 3.0 2.6 
Min. de Hacienda y C. P. 2.8 2.7 2.2 2.1 2.1 1.7 1.5 1.8 1.3 1.3 1.4 
Policía Nacional - Admini- 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 0.9 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.1 
Dep/to Adm. de Seguridad 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.1 
Contraloría General de la Rep. 2.2 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.5 1.1 0.7 0.8 
Registr. Nal. del Estado Civil 0.7 2.6 1.6 2.5 2.6 2.5 2.6 2.5 3.4 2.9 0.6 
Procur. General de la Nación 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Congreso de la Rep. 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Super. de Notariado y Registro 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.4 
Min. de Salud 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.2 
Min. de Relaciones Exteriores 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 
Min. de Transporte 0.6 0.5 1.1 2.3 2.2 2.0 1.9 1.6 1.0 0.2 0.2 
Min. de Trabajo y Seg. Social 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Min. de Justicia 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.3 0.1 0.1 
DANE 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 
Dep/to Adm. Nal. de Coop. 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Dep/to Nal. de Planeación 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Min. de Comunicaciones 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Min. de Educación Nacional 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Min. de Minas y Energía 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Min. del Interior 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Presidencia de la Rep. 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Super. Bancaria 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Super. de Sociedades 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Min. del Medio Ambiente - - - - - - - - - 0.1 0.1 
Min. de Comercio Exterior - - - - - - - 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 
Min. de Agricultura 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Dep/to Adm. de la Func. 
Pública 
0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Super. de Control de Cambios 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Super. de Industria y Comercio 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Super. de Subsidio Familiar 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Super. de Valores - - - - - - - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Super. de Vig. y Seg.Privada - - - - - - - - 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Super. General de Puertos - - - - - - - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Super. Nacional de Salud 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Super. de Servicios Públicos - - - - - - - - - 0.0 0.0 
Oficinas de Registro de IIPP. 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 - - 
Veeduría del Tesoro - - - - - - - 0.0 0.0 - - 
Dep/to Adm, de Aeron. Civil 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 - - - 
Dep/to Adm. de Intend. y Com. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 - - - - - 
Fonade 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 - - - 
Min. de Desarrollo Económico 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 - - - 
            
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Las entidades están ordenadas en función de la participación que tenían en 1995. 
 






Empleo público - Participación (%) acumulada - Orden nacional, nivel central, más docentes (1985-
1995) 
 
 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
            
Docentes 46.1 43.5 43.0 40.3 41.7 41.1 43.6 41.2 41.0 40.0 41.0 
Fuerz. Militares - Pie fuerza - 65.2 63.1 64.9 64.5 63.2 64.4 65.7 63.1 64.0 63.7 66.2 
Policía Nacional - Pie fuerza - 78.6 76.2 78.1 77.2 76.6 77.6 79.1 77.5 78.4 79.6 81.9 
Rama Judicial 82.5 80.0 82.6 81.4 80.8 81.5 82.5 80.9 82.0 83.1 85.6 
Fiscalía Gen. de la Nación 82.5 80.0 82.6 81.4 80.8 81.5 82.5 82.4 83.5 85.7 88.8 
Fuerz. Militares -Adminis- 85.1 83.8 85.0 83.7 83.3 83.8 84.8 84.7 86.3 88.8 91.4 
Min. de Hacienda y C. P. 88.0 86.5 87.2 85.7 85.4 85.5 86.2 86.5 87.5 90.0 92.8 
Dep/to Adm. de Seguridad 88.9 87.7 88.3 86.8 86.4 86.7 87.3 87.5 88.6 91.3 93.9 
Policía Nacional - Admini- 90.4 89.0 89.6 88.0 87.7 88.0 88.2 88.7 89.9 92.7 95.0 
Contraloría Gen. de la Repúb. 92.6 91.0 91.5 89.8 89.6 89.7 90.0 90.3 90.9 93.3 95.8 
            
 
Las entidades están ordenadas en función del número de empleados públicos que tenía en 1995. 
 




























Evolución de los tributos (directos e 
indirectos) del Gobierno Central Nacional 
(1962-2002).  Porcentaje del PIB 
 
Fuente: Cálculos de los autores a partir del Dane 




Evolución de los impuestos directos e 
indirectos del Gobierno Central Nacional 
(1962-2002).  Porcentaje del PIB. 
 
La línea negra corresponde a los impuestos 
indirectos.  Y la roja a los impuestos directos. 
 
Fuente: Cálculos de los autores a partir del Dane 
y del Banco de la República. 
 
Cuadro 10 
Principales normas tributarias 
José Manuel Marroquín 1897   Aumento al impuesto al tabaco, fósforo y cigarrillo 
Manuel Reyes 1905 Ley 59 Aumento en la tarifa de aduanas y nacionalización de los impuestos departamentales 
José Vicente Concha 1914-1917 
Leyes 26 y 69 
- decreto 2089 
Creación de impuestos al consumo suntuario (cerveza, 
fósforos, naipe). 
Marco Fidel Suárez 1918 Ley 56 Establece el impuesto de renta 
Enrique Olaya Herrera 1931 Ley 81 Renta a las sociedades, las deducciones por depreciación.  Se establece el sistema de retención en la fuente 
Alfonso López Pumarejo 1935 Ley 78 Crea impuesto sobre exceso de utilidades y sobre patrimonio 
Alfonso López Pumarejo 1942 Ley 45 Sobretasa a la renta por los efectos de la Segunda Guerra Mundial 
Gustavo Rojas Pinilla 1953 Decretos 2317 y 2615 
Gravo los dividendos distribuidos por las sociedades anónimas 
en cabeza de los socios, establece la doble tributación 
Gustavo Rojas Pinilla 1956   Sobretasa del 20% en impuesto a la renta debido a crisis fiscal por bajos precios del café 
Alberto Lleras Camargo 1960 Ley 81 Gravó las ganancias de capital e incorporó un régimen de presunción de renta sobre la propiedad rural 
Guillermo León Valencia 1963 Ley 21 Creo impuesto a las ventas vigente desde 1965. Sobretasa de de 20% impuesto de renta por dos años 
Guillermo León Valencia 1963 Decreto Ley 3190 
Establece la retención en la fuente sobre toda clase de ingreso 
gravable 
Carlos Lleras Restrepo 1966 Decreto 2933 Establece tasa máxima de retención en la fuente de 10% sobre salarios 
Carlos Lleras Restrepo 1967 Decreto 444 - ley 64 de 1967 
Impuestos sobre remesas del exterior e impuesto a la gasolina 
y el acpm 
Misael Pastrana Borrero 1973 Leyes 4, 5, 6 
Renta presuntiva en el agro. Amplia exenciones personales 
del sector agropecuario. Modifica el impuesto básico de renta 
a personas jurídicas.  En renta fija una tasa única de 40% para 
las "sociedades anónimas y asimiladas" y otra del 20% para 
las "limitadas y asimiladas". Eleva la tarifa  máxima del 
impuesto de renta a las personas naturales del 52% al 56%. 
Amplia base IVA. 
Alfonso López Michelsen 1974-1975 
Decr. 2053, 
2348, 2247,  
ley 49  
Moderniza el sistema tributario.  Busca que la tributación 
responda a un nuevo enfoque de Estado, compatible con las 
medidas de liberalización de la economía. 
Belisario Betancur 1983 Leyes 9 y 14 
Reducción en las tasas: la tasa marginal máxima del impuesto 
de renta pasó de 56% a 49%.  IVA con una tasa única a 10%. 
Eliminó la doble tributación de las sociedades anónimas. 
Virgilio Barco Vargas 1986 Ley 75 
Reducción de las tasas máximas de renta. La máxima pasó a 
30%.  El 90% de los salarios exentos de retención. Elimina la 
doble tributación. 
César Gaviría Trujillo 1990 Ley 44 Facultad de los contribuyentes para fijar avalúo del inmueble. Sistema de tarifas flexibles para el impuesto predial unificado 
César Gaviría Trujillo 1990 Ley 49 
Amnistía que permite la entrada de capitales colombianos 
puestos en el exterior. Incremento del IVA del 10% al 12%. 
Reducción del arancel promedio del 16.5% al 7%. 
César Gaviría Trujillo 1992 Ley 6 Sobretasa del 25% sobre el impuesto a la renta. Aumento del IVA del 12% al 14%. IVA de 35% - 45% para bienes de lujo. 
César Gaviría Trujillo 1993 Ley 100 Incremento en 10% de los impuesto de nómina 
Ernesto Samper Pizano 1994 Ley 174 Ajustes por inflación. Le dio piso legal a las tarifas de retención en la fuente.  
Ernesto Samper Pizano 1995 Ley 223 
Renta presuntiva de 1,5% sobre patrimonio bruto y aumenta la 
renta presuntiva sobre el patrimonio liquido a 5%.  Aumenta la 
tasa de renta del 30% para personas jurídicas. Eliminó la 
doble tributación. Aumenta la tasa del IVA a 16% 
Andrés Pastrana Arango 1998 Decretos 2330 y 2331 
Emergencia económica. Crea el impuesto a las transacciones 
financieras (2 x 1000) 
Andrés Pastrana Arango 1998 Ley 488 
Nuevos contribuyentes del impuesto a la renta: cajas de 
compensación familiar y fondo de empleados, asociaciones 
gremiales.  Elimina renta presuntiva sobre patrimonio bruto.  
IVA se reduce de 16% a 15%. Sobretasa a la gasolina. 
Andrés Pastrana Arango 2000 Ley 633 Modifica renta presuntiva. La tarifa general del IVA es del 16%.  El gravamen a los movimientos financieros se eleva al 3x1000) 
Álvaro Uribe Vélez 2002 Ley 788 Sobretasa a la renta equivalente al 10%.  IVA diferenciales del  2%, 7% 
Álvaro Uribe Vélez 2003 Ley 863 
Sobretasa del 10% a renta.  Impuesto de 0,3% al patrimonio. 
Determinó una deducción de 2 puntos del IVA para compras 
de crédito 
Fuente: Elaboración de los autores a partir de Junguito y Rincón (2007 b). 
	  
